It has now been a little more than a week since my return from Tunisia.  And, like the views set forth in this column, I too find the question of France, and Tunisia’s relationship with France, to be an ominous cloud on the horizon, obscuring what I hope is Tunisia’s inevitable march toward democracy.

Over the last three days (May 31-June 2), I have had the opportunity to discuss the Tunisian Revolution with several Tunisian intellectuals, both religious and secular.  And while it would be presumptuous of me to believe that in three days I am in a position to speak authoritatively about the significance of this divide, and what it means for the future of the Tunisian Revolution, I think it is possible to make a few tentative conclusions. On the positive side of the ledger, there appears to be a genuine desire from both the supporters of the Nahda and the secular parties to make this transition a successful one, despite the profound differences that separate the two sides.  The principle incentive these otherwise warring-sides have to reach some kind of détente that would allow for a modicum of democracy is the fear that Tunisia could relapse to the nightmare of Zayn al-ʻAbidin Ben Ali.