With the second-round of the historical Egyptian presidential election fast approaching, Egyptian activists are deeply divided, with some arguing in favor of one or another of the two candidates, on the grounds of choosing the lesser of two evils with disagreements over which candidate is the “lesser” of the evils, another group advocating a boycott of the final round, and a third advocating voters indicate their support for a “revolutionary” candidate by intentionally invalidating their ballots.  I, for one, have no doubt that the best outcome for the run-off, the one that maximizes the likelihood that the revolution will achieve its goals, is that Muhammad Mursi, the presidential candidate for the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (“FJP”), defeats Ahmad Shafiq, an old regime stalwart and Hosni Mubarak’s last prime minister before being forced to resign by revolutionary forces. 

Here is a link to the final results as prepared by the reliable Iyad al-Baghdadi.

As of 4:30 pm, Egypt time:

16:30 FINAL Results in 25 governorates aggregated by Ahram Online shows that with about 41.8 per cent turnout, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed Mursi remains in the lead, followed by Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, while the leftist candidate, Hamdeen Sabbahi, who proved to be the dark horse of the race, fell back to third place. Still waiting for Cairo and Giza results, which will be decisive.

Mursi 4,406,782 (26.48 per cent)
Shafiq 4,115,840 (24.74 per cent)
Sabbahi 3,329,519 (20.01 per cent)
Abul-Fotouh 2,959,937 (17.79 per cent)
Moussa 1,778,244 (10.69 per cent)

So, it now looks like Egyptians will be facing a referendum between Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The results of the first round of Egypt’s historical presidential elections have resulted in an election that brings together the two most polarizing candidates in the field, Ahmad Shafiq and Muhammad Mursi. Unsurprisingly, many, including myself, are disappointed, if not depressed, at this outcome: essentially, one half of Egyptians are being asked to choose between two candidates that probably represented their last choice among all the original candidates.  There is a very real risk, in the light of this polarization, that Ahmad Shafiq will win, and the regime will be “vindicated.”  Indeed, I think a lot of people are certain that in a head to head match up between Shafiq and Mursi, Shafiq will win handily, the assumption being that the aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood — especially given its control of Parliament — will lead a majority of voters to hold their nose and vote for Shafiq.  While I hope this is not the case, I think this will be the probable outcome: a victory for Shafiq.  However, it nonetheless behooves us to consider why Shafiq might win, and what it means for Egyptian politics, and more importantly, Egypt’s short term future. 

Today, the acting prime minister of Egypt, Ahmad Shafiq, resigned, and was replaced by `Isam Sharaf.   The opposition’s successful insistence on the resignation of Shafiq indicates the depth and breadth of the revolution’s popular support and gives those of us who are hoping that the January 25th Revolution will result in a genuine democratic transformation an objective basis to believe that this goal will be achieved.  Why is it so significant that Shafiq resigned in the face of popular pressure? In the wake of Mubarak’s resignation, a debate has raged in Egypt between those who describe the events of Jan. 25 as a revolution whose goals were to transform the nature of the Egyptian state and its relationship to the Egyptian people, and those  who dismiss it as a revolt centered around succession, nothing more or less.  Events subsequent to Mubarak have removed all doubts surrounding this question.  The people want a revolution, not a change in succession.  Shafiq’s resignation is clear proof that the revolutionary program is ascendant at this moment in time, and the Supreme Military Council remains substantially constrained by the popular will.  Nor is it likely that there can be a return to the status quo ante.  Even before Shafiq resigned, the fact that he was forced to appear on Egyptian talk shows and defend his statements before a skeptical host and confrontational guests means that the age of Egyptian authoritarianism, and with it Arab authoritarianism, is gone.  At a minimum, Jan. 25th has put an end to that stage of Egyptian political development.  We now have good reason to hope for real democratic reform and accountability.