Many revolutionaries who voted for Shafik, or who abstained or nullified their vote, did so on the grounds that they were defending the idea of a “civil” state.  This suggests that, in their mind, there are only two kinds of states in the world: “civil” states and “religious” states. 

According to this report in the New York Times, voter turnout in Egypt is very low, and consists almost entirely of older Egyptians.  This suggests that Ahmed Shafik will likely win, perhaps by a very large margin.  What will the consequences be of a Shafik victory for Egypt? 

This is the latest that I have been able to find on the results, courtesy of Ahram Online.  It is important to bear in mind that the results from Cairo are not in.  That should represent another 6 million votes based on Alexandria’s turn out. If Cairenes voted like Alexandrians, it could push Shafiq down dramatically.

13:30 Final results aggregated by Ahram Online of counted votes in 18 out of 27 governorates (Daqahliya, Sharqiya, Alexandria, Beheira, Gharbiya, Minya, Sohag, Menoufiya, Kafr El-Sheikh, Qena, Beni Suef, Aswan, Damietta, Luxor, Port Said, Suez, Red Sea and South Sinai) show that with 41.6 per cent turnout, Brotherhood candidate Mursi is in first place, followed by Mubarak’s last prime minister Shafiq, while the Nasserist candidate Sabbahi, the surprise of this election so far, has fallen back into third place – after the totals of Sharqiya and Sohag governorates were announced.

The results thus far are as following:

1. Mursi 3,451,433 (25.59 per cent)
2. Shafiq 3,378,998 (25.05 per cent)
3. Sabbahi 2,862,143 (21.22 per cent)
4. Abul-Fotouh 2,362,956 (17.52 per cent)
5. Moussa 1,431,239 (10.61 per cent)
   

So, it now looks like Egyptians will be facing a referendum between Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The results of the first round of Egypt’s historical presidential elections have resulted in an election that brings together the two most polarizing candidates in the field, Ahmad Shafiq and Muhammad Mursi. Unsurprisingly, many, including myself, are disappointed, if not depressed, at this outcome: essentially, one half of Egyptians are being asked to choose between two candidates that probably represented their last choice among all the original candidates.  There is a very real risk, in the light of this polarization, that Ahmad Shafiq will win, and the regime will be “vindicated.”  Indeed, I think a lot of people are certain that in a head to head match up between Shafiq and Mursi, Shafiq will win handily, the assumption being that the aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood — especially given its control of Parliament — will lead a majority of voters to hold their nose and vote for Shafiq.  While I hope this is not the case, I think this will be the probable outcome: a victory for Shafiq.  However, it nonetheless behooves us to consider why Shafiq might win, and what it means for Egyptian politics, and more importantly, Egypt’s short term future. 

The Islamic Monthly, the best news magazine published by Muslims in North America, recently published my essay on religion and the Arab Spring. It is now available on the web.

Today’s Guardian has an article criticizing Mubarak-era agricultural policies.  The situation is more complicated than  the article suggests.  The article confuses two things which should remain separate: what kinds of crops Egypt should produce, and where they should produce them.  There is little reason to discourage substitution of higher value crops for lower value ones, but there are very good reasons to oppose Egypt’s land use policies under Mubarak, which encouraged inefficient reclamation and irrigation of the desert while it turned a blind eye to the illegal construction of housing on fertile Nile land, the best example being Giza.  When I was a kid, and I came to Egypt in the 70’s, the trip from the Nile to the Giza pyramids took one through incredibly fertile agricultural land.  Now, as everyone who has been to Cairo knows, it is a giant, urban sprawl.  That, in my opinion, is the real scandal.  Egypt was the 18th largest producer of wheat in the world in 2010, and its production had increased in 2010 by 25% relative to its wheat production in 1997. If we use its 2009 output, its highest year (8.5 million metric tons), increase in production since 1997 was an even more impressive 49% from 1997’s 5.7 million metric tons.  If we go back to 1981, when Mubarak assumed power, Egypt produced a mere 1.9 million metric tons of wheat.  So, as is much of the case with Mubarak’s legacy, it is more a case of incomplete and inefficient reform, combined with corruption, rather than complete failure.