On December 13, 2024, the Oxford Union held a debate on Israel as an apartheid state engaging in genocide against the Palestinian people. This is the link to Susan Abulhawa’s speech that evening. It was a very moving and powerful twenty minute presentation. Everyone should listen to it.

For anyone with the least awareness of the recent history of the Middle East, the most recent violence that began when Hamas launched a devastating assault on Israeli military bases and kibbutzim along the cease-fire lines between Israel and the Gaza Strip, was the culmination of a more than 75 year history of conflict between first, Zionist settlers, and then, the Israeli state, and Palestinian Arabs who were obstacles to the realization of the Zionist state. We are now fast approaching the denouement: either peace based on recognition of the equality of Jew and Palestinian Arab in historical Palestine, or something approaching genocide. If Israel chooses the latter strategy — and it seems likely that it will — it will not stop with Gaza. It will quickly turn its attention to the Palestinians in the West Bank and seek to liquidate as many of them as possible too. The only way to put an end to this slaughter, and restore a dynamic for peace, is intervention by outside powers, namely, the United States, but everything seems to suggest that the United States, under the leadership of “Genocide Joe” Biden, has come to accept genocide as a solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict.

How did we get here? In my opinion, the basic dynamic of the conflict between Israel and Palestine can only be understood through what behavioral economists call the ultimatum game. One of the lessons of the ultimatum game is that human beings have a general tendency to reject unjust outcomes, even when submitting to an unjust outcome would advance their economic welfare from the perspective of classical economics.

The tendency of human beings to prefer self-destruction over submission to unjust outcomes is well-illustrated in the famous Melian Dialogue of Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian Wars, the classical account of a several decades’ long war between Athens and Sparta over domination of the ancient Greek world.

In 2005, before I became a law professor, but was already despondent over the future of the Middle East and despairing over a just settlement of the Palestine/Israel conflict with the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process, I wrote a short essay, “Palestine and the Melian Dialogue.” The Melian Dialogue is a poignant presentation of the conflict between perceived right and the realities of might, precisely what I believe drives the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The Zionist movement, and later Israel, has always relied on overwhelming military might to create facts favorable to its political ambitions, and then seeks to compel the Palestinians to recognize those facts, regardless of the dubiousness of Israel’s normative claims. Given the structure of the interactions between Israel and Palestine, the only rational moves for Palestine are either to surrender or, by engaging in effective, but ultimately self-destructive, violence, convince Israel that it would be better off making a more generous offer. But for a strategy of resistance to superior power to prevail, the weaker party must also rely on the possibility of third-party intervention, others moved to act based on the injustice they see being done. Hence, the necessity of international law for the Palestinians, but its irrelevance to Israel.

We are witnessing this dynamic in real time today, as Israel applies genocidal violence against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and supporters of the Palestinians’ rights are mobilizing worldwide to restrain Israel in the name of international legality. My 2005 essay, although written almost 18 years ago, is frighteningly relevant to current events. I reproduce it below:

Watching the progress of the bloodletting among Palestinians and Israelis, one feels that he is a witness to a reenactment of Thucydides’ Melian dialogue.  Thucydides, the celebrated ancient Greek historian, tells us that when mighty Athens “invited” the tiny island of Melos to join its empire, the Melians responded by noting pessimistically that “all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery [if we submit and accept your terms].”  The Athenians dismissed the relevance of the Melians’ response, telling them that “you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”  The Athenians warned the Melians of the grave consequences that would befall their land if they stubbornly insisted on independence, warning them against entertaining hope in either the gods or their kindred against Athens’ awful might.  The Melians, however, disdained the path of prudence, and instead, did choose to place their trust in “the gods . . . and in the help of men.”  Unfortunately for the citizens of Melos, the gods and men proved themselves unworthy of their trust. The Athenians laid siege to their city, and after some initial setbacks, they took the island, killed all the adult males, enslaved the women and children, and replaced the Melians with Athenian settlers.

Today’s Palestinians are in a situation not substantially different from that facing the Melians – either to stand on right, and face almost certain annihilation, or to accept the path of prudence, and submit to permanent Israeli domination.  In a rare moment of lucidity, Newsweek, at the time of the Camp David II negotiations, noted that peace would require Palestinians to “accept the bittersweet reality of permanent domination by Israel.”  In that one sentence, the naked power that lay behind the peace process was made plain to all by disclosing, honestly and forthrightly, that the purpose of the peace process was not to establish reasonable terms of coexistence between Arabs and Israelis; rather, its purpose was to enshrine Israeli domination over the Palestinians by “convincing” them that it was more prudent to submit to superior power than it was to stand fast on principle.  As we now know, the Palestinians, like the Melians before them, “foolishly” chose to have hope in the future rather than to submit to a certainty of domination, a domination made more “bittersweet” if obtained under the imprimatur of a legitimate peace treaty.

That the expected outcome of the peace process was not to be peace so much as submission should not have surprised any but the most casual observer of Israeli-Palestinian relations.  When Theodore Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, dispatched two rabbis on a fact-finding mission to Palestine in the late 19^th-century, they reported to him that “[t]he bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man,” a reference to the incontestable fact that Palestine was not an empty land awaiting Jewish settlement, but a land that already teemed with inhabitants, inhabitants who lived in its cities and towns, inhabitants who developed that country with their labor, as demonstrated in their arts, crafts, agriculture, business, and other manifestations of human civilization.   Instead of this fact deterring the Zionist project, however, the Zionist movement adopted the strategy of the “Iron Wall”: Zionism would prevail over the Palestinians not on the basis of a superior moral claim that could be presented to Palestinians with the reasonable expectation that they would give it their assent, but on the basis of overwhelmingly superior power, presented in the nature of a fait accompli or ultimatums, that would compel the Palestinians to submit to the Zionist program.  

Zionism’s stubborn refusal to recognize the existence of inalienable Palestinian rights in historical Palestine has resulted in the two sides being caught in a deadly ultimatum game.  The internal logic of an ultimatum game requires that each move be accompanied by a marginal increase in violence until one of two possible long-term outcomes is reached: either both parties realize the irrationality of the game, and abandon it in favor of a compromise based in equality, or the stronger player obliterates the weaker one. 

The collapse of the peace process, the ensuing bloodletting, and the strategies subsequently deployed by both the Israelis and the Palestinians during Intifada II are perfectly predictable consequences of a framework that afforded no concern to legality.  Some might dismiss a stubborn insistence upon legal rights as either pie-in-the-sky idealism, or extremely dangerous insofar as it promotes false hope in the Palestinians, or both.  Yet, lawyers know that in the absence of a baseline of entitlements that only law provides, it is virtually impossible for any negotiation to be concluded successfully.  In a context of lawlessness, each party gets only what it is strong enough to take.  By its very nature, therefore, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, has encouraged unilateral actions that only produces in the other side the desire to strike quicker, faster, and harder. 

Moreover, because the Israelis enjoy overwhelming military, the Palestinians know that the end game is their annihilation, and accordingly, the only way they can “win” this game with Israel is to convince it that the cost of victory is too high by demonstrating their toughness.  Indeed, if we are to believe Thucydides, the Melians, upon rejecting the Athenians’ offer, did not sit around waiting for the inevitable Athenian invasion: They immediately initiated hostilities with Athens. But, because of the overwhelming disparity in the power of the two sides, the only likely outcome, if the parties are left to themselves, is the destruction of the Palestinians. Certainly Israel has no incentive to abandon the game, and the Palestinians, cannot abandon the game without surrendering.  The United States is the only power that can impress upon both parties the desirability of abandoning their game.  Were the Bush administration to insist that the peace process proceed on the basis of the universal values enshrined in international humanitarian law, it would rescue the Israelis and the Palestinians from the ever-increasing spiral of violence that marks the grim progress of an ultimatum game.  So far at least, the Bush administration has eschewed a law-based approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and has tacitly chosen to remain passive in the face of Israel’s decision to proceed in its next round of escalation.  In these circumstances no one, especially President Bush, should be surprised that, in the words of Yeats’ Second Coming, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,” and we are all left to wonder “what rough beast, its hour come round at last, Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born?”  And, Israel too, ought to heed both the prudential words of the Melians – that exercise of might unrestrained by justice inevitably reduces security, as all will feel threatened and will eventually confront what they collectively perceive to be a dangerous threat – as well as the eventual, disastrous defeat the Athenians suffered at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War.   Israel may very well its immediate battle with the Palestinians, but in so doing, it may also end up losing the war.