Contrasts Between Tunisia and Egypt

Jun 11

One important difference, it appears to me, between the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt, respectively, is the relatively greater incidence in Tunisia of public fora that bring together spokespersons from various political and ideological movements in the country simultaneously.  The sense I got from my days in Egypt, however, was that the warring-ideological groups tend to speak to the press rather than to each other, much less in the context of a shared public forum.  In Tunisia, by contrast, there are several civil society organizations that sponsor fora to promote public debate and dialogue on the various choices facing the country, and while I have not seen any evidence that different groups have moved substantially from their core positions, I think the fact that they can sit together on the same panel and share, discuss and debate their country’s future augurs well for the success of their transitions.

I attend one such forum yesterday at a public institution called “Dar al-Thaqafa Ibn Rashiq,” (The Ibn Rashiq Cultural Centre, Ibn Rashiq being a famous medieval literary figure) that was sponsored by a civic organization with the name “Muntada Ibn Rushd.”  There are other such organizations, including one called “Muntada al-Jahiz.” While relatively few such organizations were permitted during the Ben Ali regime, apparently scores have been opened since the end of the Revolution, a fact that has helped raise public awareness of the various issues facing Tunisians in the context of the transition.  If anyone knows of equivalent efforts of Egypt, I would appreciate being corrected on this point, but at least from the perspective of an institutional framework for establishing a collective public sphere, the Tunisians appear way ahead of the Egyptians.

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Some Thoughts on the Secular-Religious Divide in Tunisia

Jun 09

Over the last three days (May 31-June 2), I have had the opportunity to discuss the Tunisian Revolution with several Tunisian intellectuals, both religious and secular.  And while it would be presumptuous of me to believe that in three days I am in a position to speak authoritatively about the significance of this divide, and what it means for the future of the Tunisian Revolution, I think it is possible to make a few tentative conclusions. On the positive side of the ledger, there appears to be a genuine desire from both the supporters of the Nahda and the secular parties to make this transition a successful one, despite the profound differences that separate the two sides.  The principle incentive these otherwise warring-sides have to reach some kind of détente that would allow for a modicum of democracy is the fear that Tunisia could relapse to the nightmare of Zayn al-ʻAbidin Ben Ali. 

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My Impression of al-Nahda

Jun 01

At 11:00 am today, I went to the new headquarters of the Tunisian political party, al-Nahda, and had the pleasure of witnessing Tunisian youth members of  “Sawty: Sawt Shabab Tunis (My Voice: The Voice of Tunisian Youth),” interview Hamadi el-Jabali and Ziyad al-Daulatli, both leaders of the Nahda Party.  The interview with Mr. Jabali was cut short after half an hour by what appeared to be an unexpected meeting that required Mr. Jabali’s immediate attention.  Thereafter, the youth were introduced to Mr. al-Daulatli who allowed the youth to question him on a wide variety of topics for almost two hours without interruption.  Without getting into the details of the discussion, I find it very difficult to believe that al-Nahda can be taken as a serious threat to democracy.  While by all appearances its leadership appears to be committed Muslims, they do not appear to be the kind of Muslims interested in imposing their beliefs on anyone.  In fact, I would say that any Egyptian government office that I have entered would have easily been more obviously “religious” in orientation than the Nahda’s official headquarters.  One thing that astonished me, for example, was the fact that the call to prayer was not even heard in their headquarters, much less was the meeting stopped to say Zuhr prayers.  This is hardly the behavior of a “fanatic” Islamist party, at least in my opinion. (Indeed, it is not at all unusual in Egypt, for example, to find that most government bureaucrats leave their desk to pray the Zuhr prayer; they are usually home by Asr time.)  Their rhetoric, moreover, continually emphasizes personal rights and freedoms, and that religious Tunisians religious and cultural rights should not be deemed any less worthy protection of Tunisians who are non-observant of Islamic norms.  Even were such rhetoric disingenuous, it has a price, and it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to climb down from the very strong claims they have made regarding the sacredness of Tunisians’ individual rights, including, their right to be bad Muslims. I heard that Yusuf al-Qaradawi will be visiting Tunisia next week, and it will be interesting to hear his perspective on al-Nahda’s proposed plan of governance and its intentional strategy of disclaiming any intent to apply Shari’a (which, in Tunisia, I have been told, means hudud and polygamy).

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First Impression of Tunisia

Jun 01

I arrived yesterday in Tunisia from Rome around 11:00 am local time, which gave me enough time to do a little bit of sightseeing as well as meet two friends with whom I had long discussions about the situation in Tunisia. My first impression upon arrival in the Tunisian airport, and one that was repeatedly confirmed throughout my first day’s experience, has  been the complete collapse of the tourist economy.  This is no doubt placing severe strain on ordinary Tunisians who depend on the large inflow of foreign tourists for their livelihoods.  The devastating impact of the absence of tourists first made its impression upon me at the airport itself, where two taxi drivers almost exchanged blows over who was going to have the right to drive me to my hotel.  

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Political Islam and Democratic Transition

Apr 15

It would be an understatement to say that westerners remain concerned about the role of Islam in democratizing Arab states.  Some, however, have suggested that secular democracy need not mean a complete exclusion of religion from the public sphere, but instead permit its participation against a background of institutions that serve to moderate the risk of a “tyranny of the majority.”   I agree that this is the most that can be reasonably obtained under present conditions in a country like Egypt.

In my opinion, modernist Islamic thought — the ideological basis of moderate Islamism –has been concerned primarily with equality before the law, establishing accountability of the government to the people, and eliminating arbitrary decision-making so as to better pursue the public good. They are attracted to democracy because they see democratic institutions as the best means to establish these ends.  Unfortunately, Islamic modernism (nor secular modernism in the post-Ottoman world, for that matter) has not been gravely concerned with pluralism as such.

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